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There are policy areas where the legal force of negative integration and the 
economic pressures of transnational factor mobility and regulatory competition 
have significantly reduced the problem-solving capacity of national political 
systems, and where this loss is not compensated by corresponding gains in 
European problem-solving capacity. Unfortunately, these include areas that are 
close to the core of output-oriented democratic legitimacy as it has evolved 
during the postwar decades in European welfare states (Marshall 1975). At the 
very minimum, their citizens have come to expect that the democratic state 
should be able
• to prevent mass unemployment that would exclude large parts of the 
working-age population from active participation in the processes of 
social production;
• to prevent extreme poverty that would force persons to live below 
socially acceptable levels of income and access to life chances; and
• to assure a fair sharing of benefits and tax burdens.
The glaring failure to maintain even these minimal assurances during the Great 
Depression destroyed the legitimacy of democratic government in Weimar 
Germany, and put it at risk in other countries. At any rate, in trying to cope with 
threatening legitimacy crises, most democratic governments found themselves 
forced to resort to protectionist policies that destroyed the integrated world 
economy of the time (Ropke 1942). After World War II, therefore, world 
markets were only gradually re-integrated under American-led international 
regimes that have been aptly characterized as ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie 
1982). They were in fact able to strengthen democratic legitimacy because they 
allowed national welfare states to gain economic benefits from international 
integration while maintaining or increasing the protection of their citizens 
against the ‘creative destruction’ associated with vigorous capitalism (Gilpin 
1987; Eichengreen 1996). In most member states of the European Union, 
citizens have come to consider these achievements of postwar welfare states as 
constitutive elements of a legitimating social contract (Jacquemin/Wright 1993). 
If they should now be revoked under the pressures of run-away globalization or 
the asymmetry of negative and positive integration in the European Community, 
there is indeed a danger that rising political disaffection will again undermine 
either the political legitimacy of democratic governments or their political 
commitment to economic integration (Ruggie 1994; Leibfried/ Rieger 1997). It 
may not be by accident, therefore, that the radical right-wing opposition in 




























































































There is reason, therefore, to search for options that could restore the political 
capacity for dealing with mass unemployment, the crisis of the welfare state and 
rising inequality at all levels of the multi-level European polity. In this paper, I 
will explore options that even in an internationalized economy could still be 
pursued nationally. I will begin with employment, and I will try to show how 
the persistent employment gap in Europe is related to the structures of European 
welfare states, and in particular to the prevailing mode of financing the welfare 
state — with the implication that appropriate structural changes could ease both, 
the problems of underemployment and the fiscal crisis of the welfare state. At 
the end of the paper, I will then discuss some of the options that might allow 
national governments to deal with the erosion of their tax base.
/. The European Employment Gap
Present political discussion in Europe emphasizes the superior employment per­
formance of the United States where the rate of unemployment is now lower 
than it is, on average, in Europe, and where the rate of job creation has been 
much higher over the last two decades or so. In fact, between 1971 and 1994, 
civilian employment increased by 55 per cent in the United States, and only by 
11 per cent in the present member states of the European Union (OECD 1996a). 
However, if anything is to be done about this European employment gap, it is 
first necessary to understand its causes.
In searching for an explanation, Keynesian economists and politicians tend to 
emphasize contingent factors. For the present decade, it can indeed be argued 
on good theoretical grounds that macro-economic policy has played an 
important role in bringing about very high levels of unemployment: Even if one 
should accept the monetarist claim that expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policy, when anticipated, will produce more inflation, rather than more 
employment, that proposition could not be reversed. Given that wages, and 
hence prices, are downward-sticky, restrictive fiscal and monetary policy is 
surely able to reduce effective demand and destroy jobs. Hence the tight-money 
response of the Bundesbank to German unification in the early 1990s must be as 
much part of the dismal European employment performance as is presently the 
desperate attempt of practically all European governments to cut budget deficits 
in order to meet the EMU criteria. These matters are well known, and nothing of 
interest could be added here.
What is more worrying, however, is the structural component of the European 
employment gap. It is reflected in the high level of long-term unemployment. In 




























































































been out of work for 12 months or longer. Among the member states of the 
European Union, this ratio varied between 17 per cent in Austria and more than 
60 per cent in Belgium and Italy, with most countries having shares of long­
term unemployment between 30 and 50 per cent (OECD 1996, Table Q). As 
everywhere, the main victims of long-term unemployment are unskilled workers 
and young job seekers with low levels of schooling.
For an explanation of the structural component of the European employment 
gap, most commentators see little need to search beyond the usual suspects that 
were blacklisted in the notorious OECD Jobs Study (1994) — institutional 
rigidities, union power, and the burdens of the welfare state. In an age of 
intensified global competition, so it is argued, government regulations and 
collective-bargaining agreements can no longer be considered ‘beneficial 
constraints’ but have become fetters that prevent European firms from achieving 
the flexibility and innovativeness that allow American firms to compete 
successfully. In addition, the European economies are laboring under the dead 
weight of bloated public sectors that are claiming more than 50 per cent of GDP 
in Sweden and Denmark, more than 40 per cent in France, Germany and other 
Continental countries, as compared to less than 30 per cent in the United States 
and Japan — and of overextended welfare states with overly generous rates of 
income replacement that have raised reservation wages and reduced the 
incentives to work.
1.1 The Measure of Success: Employment Ratios
In my view, these conventional explanations are not focusing on the critical 
structural factors. If the employment performance of different countries is to be 
evaluated and explained, there is, first, a need for valid indicators of success. 
For this, the usual reference to unemployment figures will not do. They do not 
include persons on disability pensions, in early retirement and other forms of 
paid non-work,1 and they are notoriously subject to political manipulation — 
the British Conservatives are said to have changed unemployment definitions 
more then thirty times during their period in office, each time reducing the 
number of the registered unemployed. Moreover, and even more important, the 
rate of unemployment is defined by reference to the size of the ‘active 
population’ which is, of course, strongly affected by factors on the supply side 
of the labor market. Thus, the willingness of married women to enter the labor 
market as job seekers may be as much affected by the separate or joint taxation
1 For a careful comparison of the Dutch and German systems of paid non-work, of which 




























































































of spouses’ incomes or the availability of day care as it is by the availability of 
jobs.
Compared to unemployment rates, employment figures and their changes over 
time seem to be a much better indicator of comparative performance — but they 
also are affected by changes on the supply side: larger populations imply more 
jobs. Even when employment figures are normalized by reference to the 
population of working age (15 to 64), comparability suffers from differences in 
working time and in the share of part-time employment (which happens to be 
unusually high in the Netherlands, for instance). With this caveat in mind, 
however, employment/population ratios still seem to be the most valid 
indicators of relative employment performance for which internationally 
comparative data are readily available in OECD publications (OECD 1996; 
1996a). I will use them throughout.2
Similarly, the causal relationship hypothesized by conventional explanations is 
not fully captured by the usual reference to the share of taxes and social security 
contributions in GDP, since a large (but variable) part of public budgets is 
actually spent on subsidies to business and on public infrastructure and services 
that should increase the productivity, and hence the international 
competitiveness, of national economies.3 Instead, I will use OECD data on the 
share of total social expenditures in GDP (OECD 1996b) which, better than any 
other internationally comparable indicator, should indeed reflect the ‘dead 
weight’ of the welfare state on the economy that is presumed to explain the poor 
European employment performance.
2 It would be possible to use total hours worked as an indicator that neutralizes differences 
in part-time employment. However, if the underlying normative criterion is the involuntary 
exclusion of large segments of the population from participation in the process of social 
production, there is little reason to consider (voluntary) part-time employment as being 
inferior.
3 I ignore here the proposition that the welfare state itself should be considered a 
productivity-increasing factor — either because it allows firms to externalize the social costs 
of efficiency-increasing decisions, or because it legitimates free-trade policies pursued by 




























































































Figure 1: Total Employment and Social Spending
Taking the latest available OECD (1996) data on employment ratios for 1995, 
and on total social expenditures for 1992, welfare spending as such does not 
seem to explain the differences in employment ratios. It is true that the United 
States and other countries with very low shares of social spending had very high 
employment ratios, and it is also true that the German score, at 65.1 per cent, 
was significantly lower, closely followed by the Netherlands (with all those part 
time jobs) at 64.3 per cent. France, at 59.5 per cent was even further behind, and 
in Belgium only 55.7 per cent of the working-age population were actually 
working. Ireland and the Southern European countries, with the notable 
exception of Portugal, scored even below the Belgian level. At the same time 
however, the Scandinavian welfare states with extremely high shares of social 
spending were also highly successful in employment terms, reaching levels that 
were as high or even slightly higher than in the United States. Overall, it should 
be said, the statistical association between employment and social spending is 
practically zero. So much for conventional wisdom?
1.2 Exposed and Sheltered Sectors
But how could one account for the fact that the most expensive welfare states 
with the highest tax burden among OECD countries and with powerful unions 
should be doing exactly as well in employment terms as the United States which 
has practically ceased being a welfare state and has just about the lowest tax 




























































































and structures? And why is it that Continental welfare states at similar levels of 
economic development, and with intermediate levels of tax burdens, should be 
doing so much less well?
The explanation is likely to be found in sectoral differences. Since the current 
debate focuses on international competitiveness, one might expect that — when 
compared to the non-taxed, deregulated and de-unionized U.S. economy — 
employment in European welfare states should be generally weak in sectors that 
are exposed to international competition.4 By implication, then, European 
countries with high levels of employment should have achieved their success in 
the sheltered sectors of the economy. Unfortunately, this theoretically 
interesting distinction is not directly represented in the employment data 
available in the OECD Labour Force Statistics. Also, the boundary is shifting as 
hitherto sheltered jobs — for instance in telecommunications, financial services 
or in the construction industry — are becoming exposed to foreign competition 
with the completion of the European internal market and under the new WTO 
rules. Opting for the most comprehensive definition, I have included 
employment in all I.S.I.C. major divisions whose products are, actually or 
potentially, exported or subject to import competition. This includes not only all 
agricultural and industrial employment, but also service employment in I.S.I.C. 
Divisions 7 (‘Transport, Storage, and Communication’) and 8 (‘Financing, 
Insurance, Real Estate, and Business Services’).
4 It is perhaps worth pointing out that, as used here, the definition of ‘exposed sectors’ does 
not depend on the greater or lesser degree of ‘openness’ of economies (i.e., the share of 
exports plus imports in GDP). Since competition works at the margin, it tends to affect the 
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Figure 2: Employment in the Exposed Sectors (ISIC 1-5, 7, 8)
Taking these branches together, and focusing now more narrowly on the United 
States and the countries of the European Union, the pattern again seems to 
disappoint conventional expectations. The overall statistical effect of the size of 
the welfare state on employment in the exposed sectors (1993 data) is extremely 
weak (and in fact slightly positive). Even more remarkable, the United States is 
not doing very well here, with an employment ratio of about 30 per cent — at 
the same level as France, and not much better than Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Italy. By contrast, the Scandinavian countries with very large welfare states, 
achieve significantly higher employment ratios than the United States, whereas 
Austria and Germany with intermediate levels of welfare spending, have the 
best employment performance in the internationally exposed sectors of the 
economy.5
Beyond the conclusion that the size of the welfare state does not seem to affect 
international competitiveness one way or another, the policy implications of 
these data are obviously ambivalent: On the one hand, countries with a high 
employment ratio in the exposed sectors will find a larger share of present jobs 
affected by the increasing pressures of international competition and by, 
perhaps temporary, downturns in the international demand for their products.
5 The employment ratios of Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal include relatively more 




























































































That justifies the present nervousness in countries that have so far been doing 
comparatively well.
On the other hand, however, one should warn of the danger that the more 
important other part of the message might be forgotten: The countries with the 
highest levels of employment in the internationally exposed sectors of the 
economy are characterized by stakeholder-oriented forms of corporate 
governance and by cooperative industrial relations that differ significantly from 
American (and British) forms of shareholder-oriented corporate governance and 
deregulated labor markets (Streeck 1992). That does not mean that there is no 
need for reforms in countries with high employment ratios — as the intensity of 
international competition increases, employment in the exposed sectors can only 
be maintained if the speed of adjustment and innovation, and hence the flexi­
bility of corporate and industrial governance, does increase as well. However, in 
view the superior employment performance of the ‘Rhine model’ (Albert 1993), 
there seems to be no reason at all for throwing it out (even if that were 
politically feasible) in favor of Anglo-American models of market driven 
corporate controls and industrial relations.
In any case, however, the data demonstrate that the generally poor employment 
performance of, say, the German economy over the last decade cannot be 
ascribed to a general loss of international competitiveness. It must find its 
explanation in the sheltered sectors of the economy. Within the definition used 
here, these comprise the service branches in I.S.I.C. 6 (‘Wholesale and Retail 
Trade, Restaurants and Hotels’) and in I.S.I.C. 9 (‘Community, Social, and 
Personal Services’) — a heterogeneous collection which, however, shares the 
characteristic that local demand is being served by locally supplied services, 
and that foreign competition plays practically no role.6 It is in these ‘local 
services’ that the data show a significant difference that could lead to an 
explanation of the poor employment performance of Continental welfare states.
Again, there is no linear relationship between employment and the size of the 
welfare state. Instead, the relationship which does exist (with an R2 of 30 per 
cent) is U-shaped, with high employment at the upper and lower ends of the 
welfare-spending scale, and low employment in the Continental welfare states 
characterized by intermediate levels of welfare expenditures. Thus, in the
6 That classification is questionable for employment in hotels and restaurants catering to 
tourists. While services are locally supplied, their consumers could opt for other locations. But 
tourism is not a separate category in OECD employment statistics, and the quantitative impact 
of the distortion seems to be limited. Countries that are strong in tourism do not seem to have 




























































































United States altogether 41 per cent of the working age population have jobs in 
local services, and Sweden is not far behind at 39 per cent. In Austria, Germany, 
France and Italy by contrast, the employment ratio of local services reaches only 
28 per cent — 13 percentage points less than in the United States (which would 
be equivalent to 6 million jobs in Germany). Finland, Portugal, the Netherlands 
and Britain are doing somewhat better, and in Denmark local-service 
employment is almost as high as in Sweden, whereas Ireland, Belgium, Spain 
and Greece have relatively few jobs in the local services.
Figure 3: Employment in Sheltered Sectors (ISIC 6 and 9)
It is worthwhile therefore to further explore the factors underlying the 
curvilinear association between local service employment and welfare spending. 
Since many of these services are in fact financed from either public or private 
sources, and may be provided by either public agencies or by non-profit 
organizations, by private professionals or by commercial firms, a further 
disaggregation along these lines may finally provide the explanation of different 
employment performances.
1.3 Public and Private Services
Again, however, internationally comparable OECD data do not reflect all 
theoretically interesting dimensions. In particular, they do not distinguish 
between publicly or privately financed local services (which would directly 




























































































employment in services provided by government agencies and services 
provided in the private sector.7
Social Spending /GDP
Figure 4: Sheltered Employment in the Private Sector
As it turns out, this distinction does in fact point to an explanation. There is a 
negative linear association between welfare spending and local services 
provided in the private sector. That it is weak (R2 = -.10) is not surprising in 
view of the widely differing role of (publicly subsidized) private charities 
among the countries included here. But it is interesting to note that, in Figure 4, 
the United States and the Netherlands occupy positions far above the regression 
line, whereas France and Belgium have very low levels of private service 
employment. Surprisingly, Spain and Austria (with considerable employment in 
tourism) are also quite weak in private services, whereas Portugal, the United 
Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Denmark, Finland and Sweden are all located fairly 
close to the regression line.
7 Again, these data are not directly available, but they can be obtained by deducting OECD 
figures on employment in ‘government services’ from total employment in divisions I.S.I.C 6 
plus I.S.I.C 9. ‘Employment in the private sector’ would thus include services performed by 





























































































Figure 5: Employment in the Public Sector
Employment in public services, by contrast, is positively and quite strongly 
(R2 = .36) associated with welfare spending. Employment ratios are by far the 
highest in Sweden and Denmark, and they are expectedly low in the United 
States. Public sector employment is even lower in the Netherlands — where 
(publicly subsidized) charities play a large role not only in the social services 
but also in education. In France, by contrast, public-sector services are stronger, 
and private-sector services weaker, than expected. Belgium and Spain have low 
levels of employment in both sectors. Germany, finally, manages to have almost 
as little employment in private sector services as is true in Sweden, and to have 
a public sector that is exactly as ‘lean’ as is true in the United States.
The curvilinear pattern of employment in the sheltered sector as a whole is thus 
a composite result of two separate linear effects: In the United States and other 
countries with a small welfare state, local service jobs are created in the private 
sector of the economy, whereas in Denmark and Sweden with large welfare 
states, the public sector is able to provide high levels of local service 
employment. But why should the Continental welfare states with intermediate- 
size social expenditures have the worst of both worlds, instead of combining 
intermediate levels of employment, in the public and in the private sector, to 




























































































2. Service Employment and the Welfare State
The explanation, I suggest, lies in differences in the levels and structures of 
national welfare state and industrial relations systems. In order to simplify the 
argument, I will now concentrate on three models only, the American, the 
Scandinavian (represented by Sweden) and the Continental (represented by 
Germany), even though I know that there are significant differences among the 
Scandinavian welfare states and even greater ones among the Continental 
systems, that need to be brought out by much more careful analyses than I could 
present here. In the American and Swedish cases, the explanations for their 
exceptionally high levels of employment in the sheltered service sectors are 
fairly straightforward.
2.1 The American Model
In the United States, generally low levels of taxation and the additional tax cuts 
of the 1980s have contributed to a highly unequal distribution of incomes 
(OECD 1995) which facilitated the simultaneous expansion of private service 
employment at the upper and at the lower end of the skill scale. Since education 
and health care are to a much larger extent than elsewhere privately financed, 
the growing demand of affluent consumers for high-quality educational and 
medical services increases the number of well-paid jobs at the professional 
level. At the same time, the failure of Congress to raise the statutory minimum 
wage combined with weak or nonexistent unions combined, with the short 
duration of unemployment benefits and the virtual absence of social assistance 
for the long-term unemployed have favored the emergence of a large low-wage 
labor market. This, in turn, facilitated the creation, or maintenance, of service 
jobs in hotels, retail trade, restaurants, and a great variety of other household 
and personal services. In these jobs, labor productivity tends to be very low. But 
since wages are also very low, the American model allows large numbers of 
low-skilled workers to find employment in the private sector. As a matter of 
fact, in 1993-1995, the share of low-wage employment8 was 25 per cent in the 
United States, as compared to only 5.2 per cent in Sweden, 7.2 per cent in 
Belgium and between 12 and 13 per cent in most other Continental countries 
(OECD 1996, Table 3.2). Thus, the up side of the American model is the 
dynamic expansion of service employment at all qualification levels. Its down
8 In the OECD study, low-paid workers are defined as full-time workers who earn less than 




























































































side is the plight of the ‘working poor’ receiving incomes below the subsistence 
level even when employed full time (Freeman 1995; Weir 1995).9
2.2 The Scandinavian Model
In Sweden and Denmark, by contrast, very high taxes, strong unions and 
generous rates of income replacement in case of unemployment have reduced 
income inequality and wage differentials to the lowest level among OECD 
countries. At the same time, education and health care are publicly financed and 
publicly provided. As a consequence, there is neither a low-wage labor market 
nor much room for private services at the professional level. Instead, high levels 
of tax revenue are used to finance universal health services and education as 
well as a wide range of free social services for families with young children, for 
the elderly, the handicapped10 and the sick, for drug addicts and immigrants. 
These services involve not only work for highly trained professionals but also 
provide a large number of decently paid jobs for persons with relatively low 
levels of formal training.
The obvious down side of the Swedish model is its dependence on very high 
levels of taxation which have become vulnerable to increasing international tax 
competition for mobile capital, and to the growing tax resistance of mobile 
professionals (Freeman 1995a). Thus the need for fiscal retrenchment in the 
1990s forced governments to reduce not only the generosity of welfare 
payments, but also the level of public-sector employment — with the 
consequence that unemployment has risen to normal European levels, even 
though the level of employment continues to be very high by international 
standards. In Denmark, however, employment has held up remarkably well even 
in the 1990s.
9 It should be emphasized, however, that the United States already has a federal program, 
the ‘Earned Income Tax Credit’ which, if adequately funded, would be perfectly suited to deal 
with the inadequate incomes of the ‘working poor’ (Haveman 1996).
10 In 1993, Sweden spent 6.39 per cent of GDP on ‘services for elderly and disabled 
people’ and on ‘family services’. In Denmark, the percentage was 4.36, and in Finland 3.01. 
The level is much lower in Luxembourg (1.23%), in the Netherlands (1.16 %), in France 
(1.11%) and in the UK (1.05%), and lower still in West Germany (0.74%) and Ireland 
(0.53%). Expenditure on these services is minimal in Belgium (0.36%), Italy (0.30%), Spain 




























































































2.3 The Continental Unemployment Trap
The more highly developed Continental welfare states, with the notable 
exception of the Netherlands, have not been able to achieve high levels of local 
services either in the public or the private sector. In contrast to the United 
States, however, their levels of employment in the public sector cannot simply 
be explained by the smaller size of the welfare state. While it is true that total 
social spending amounts to more than 37 per cent in Sweden, whereas 
Continental welfare states tend to absorb only between 25 and 30 per cent of 
GDP, that is still much more than the 15 per cent share of social spending in the 
United States (OECD 1996b). If nevertheless public-sector employment in 
Germany is exactly as low as it is in the United States, that appears as a path- 
dependent consequence of the Bismarckian model of the welfare state, that was 
originally meant to deal only with the social risks arising if the single (male) 
breadwinner was unable to support his family through full-time work (Esping- 
Andersen 1990). Hence, Continental welfare states provide quite generous 
transfer payments in cases of disability, retirement and unemployment — but 
they never developed a Scandinavian commitment to social services that would 
complement or compete with the functions performed in the family by mothers, 
wives and daughters (see note 10, above). As a consequence, the Continental 
welfare state does not create much employment in publicly financed social 
services.
There are of course well paid professional jobs in public education and in 
publicly-financed health care provided in public hospitals or in private practice. 
But the fact that these services are publicly financed, from tax revenues or from 
social insurance funds, implies that employment growth is held back or even 
reversed by efforts to reduce tax burdens and public-sector budget deficits, 
whereas employment in the United States will dynamically expand as affluent 
consumers are increasing their demand for high-quality services in education 
and health care in the private sector.11
In Continental welfare states, service employment in the private sector is held 
back at the upper end of labor market by the fact that public education and 
publicly financed health care are largely provided free of charge. Thus even 
when the quality and quantity of publicly financed services should be 
unsatisfactory, consumers will hesitate to switch to privately supplied services 
for which — in addition to their tax bill — they would have to pay high prices
11 Moreover, since American state universities are also charging high tuition fees, even 




























































































covering the full cost of production. Hence high-quality private services are 
more or less confined to the niches of luxury markets.
At the lower end of the labor market, however, the Continental welfare state is 
as effective as its Scandinavian counterpart in destroying the viability of a low- 
wage service jobs in the private sector. Compared to the United States, at any 
rate, levels of taxation are high, unions are strong, income inequality and wage 
differentials are low,12 and reservation wages are defined by relatively generous 
wage replacement in case of unemployment and indefinitely available social 
assistance payments. Hence the American problem of the ‘working poor’ with 
full-time jobs at wages below the subsistence level could not arise in either the 
Scandinavian or the Continental welfare states. But in avoiding that problem, 
the Continental model is actually destroying more employment opportunities in 
the private sector than is even true in Scandinavian welfare states.
The reason is that Continental welfare states are primarily financed through 
payroll taxes. In Germany, for instance, 74 per cent of total social expenditures 
were financed through workers’ and employers’ contributions to social 
insurance systems in 1991, and in France that was true of 82 per cent. In 
Germany, these contributions amount to about 42 per cent of the nominal wage 
paid be the employer. By contrast, Scandinavian welfare states are to a larger 
extent financed from general tax revenues which, in Denmark, did amount to 83 
per cent of total social spending, leaving only 17 per cent to be paid as 
surcharge on wages (BMA 1995).
The dependence of payroll taxes makes Continental welfare states particularly 
vulnerable to any increase in unemployment which increases expenditures and 
reduces revenues at the same time. As a consequence, it becomes then necessary 
to either reduce benefits at a time when more persons become dependent upon 
them, or to raise payroll taxes at a time when firms are particularly sensitive to 
any increase in labor costs. Neither of these options is politically easy to 
implement. Moreover, there is now a widespread belief that social insurance 
contributions, collected in the form of payroll taxes, are themselves a major 
cause of high levels of unemployment. By raising the price of labor, so it is 
argued, they reduce international competitiveness and contribute to the 
substitution of labor by capital.
12 In 1993, the ratio of median wages (for men and women) to wages in the lowest decile 
(D5/D1) was 2.05 in the U.S., 1.79 in the UK, 1.75 in Italy, 1.65 in Japan, 1.64 in France, 1.54 
in the Netherlands, 1.44 in Germany, 1.43 in Belgium and 1.34 in Sweden. Germany, 
incidentally, is practically the only OECD country where wage differentials have continuously 




























































































From an economic point of view, however, not all of these arguments are well 
founded. If the price of labor were generally raised by social insurance 
contributions (which in Germany amount to more than forty per cent of the total 
wage bill), the effect on international competitiveness would be neutralized by a 
fall in the exchange rate — and if devaluation were prevented by monetary 
policy, the lack of competitiveness would have to show in the form of a 
persistent trade deficit. Since neither of these effects seem to have been 
generally true for Continental welfare states over the last decade (OECD 
1996c), it is reasonable to think that the impact of social insurance contributions 
on the cost of labor has been internalized, together with all other factors 
affecting the cost of production, in the normal processes of wage setting (Hartel 
1997).13 As a consequence, the take-home pay of workers in countries that rely 
largely on payroll taxes will be lower than it would otherwise have been — 
which also will reduce the effect on the rate of substitution between capital and 
labor.
All that, however, is true only at the middle and upper ranges of the labor 
market, whereas things are very different at the lower end of the pay scale. 
Here, the availability of social assistance defines a lower threshold below which 
net wages cannot be reduced. Thus, certain types of ‘bad jobs’, which are 
economically viable in the United States, simply could not exist in Europe — 
which is, of course, a fully intended effect of European welfare states. But what 
is probably not intended, is the impact of payroll taxes on jobs well above the 
subsistence level.
If the net wage of the worker cannot fall below a guaranteed minimum, the 
consequence is that any social insurance contributions, payroll taxes and wage 
taxes that are levied on jobs at the lower end of the pay scale will not be 
absorbed by the employee but must be added to the total labor cost borne by the 
employer. In Germany, that would amount to a surcharge (social insurance 
contributions plus wage tax) of at least 50 per cent. Assuming that additional 
overhead costs will be proportional to total labor cost, the implication is that the 
minimum productivity that a job must reach in order to be viable in the market 
is raised by more than 50 per cent above the level that would be required if 
labor costs were equal to the net reservation wage of the worker. As a 
consequence, a considerable range of perfectly decent jobs which, in the 
absence of payroll taxes, would be commercially viable are eliminated from the 
private labor market of Continental welfare states.
13 This is not meant to deny that increases in the rate of social insurance contributions will 
have negative effects on employment, since the adjustment of wages will take time, especially 

































































































Figure 6: Social Assistance in Germany
In Germany, to give a numerical example, social assistance for a single person 
amounts to about DM 1100 per month, in addition to which that person may 
earn up to DM 250 by part-time work. Any additional income from work, 
however, is fully set off against social assistance — i.e., it is taxed at a marginal 
rate of 100 percent. Assuming that an additional financial incentive is needed to 
make full-time work attractive, the minimum net reservation wage in Germany 
may presently amount to about DM 1600 per month (i.e. about DM 10, or a bit 
less than US $ 6, per hour). In order to provide the worker with that net wage, 
however, the employer will have to pay a total wage bill of at least DM 2400 
per month which — if due allowance is made for other taxes and overhead — 
will allow only jobs with fairly high productivity to survive in the private 




























































































states are causing high levels of long-term unemployment for persons with low 
levels of marketable skills.14
2.4 Continental Options
If the downside of the American model is the plight of the working poor, and if 
the Scandinavian model has become highly vulnerable to the erosion of its tax 
base, Continental welfare states suffer from their inability to expand domestic- 
service employment either in the public or in the private sector. In the abstract, 
one might think that the Continental employment gap might be closed by 
moving either in the American or in the Scandinavian direction. If both options 
were equally feasible, political preferences would widely diverge. Practically 
speaking, however, the Scandinavian option appears to be out of the question. 
The reasons are financial and political. Continental welfare states, even though 
less expensive than their Scandinavian counterparts, are already hard-pressed 
financially. Thus, a Scandinavian-type service expansion would either require 
substantial tax increases or further reductions of welfare transfers; at the same 
time, there is no large and well organized political demand for additional public 
services, whereas the political opposition against either tax increases or further 
cutbacks in social transfers is already highly mobilized. Thus a Scandinavian 
solution is not even discussed on the Left, whereas the ‘American way’ is 
strongly advocated by business associations and neoliberal parties demanding to 
cut social assistance to the bone. It is equally strongly resisted by unions and 
political parties defending the ‘Rhine model’. As a consequence, any change is 
blocked and mass unemployment continues to rise.
Nevertheless, it is possible to specify, at least in the abstract, strategies through 
which Continental welfare states could help to create, rather than to destroy, 
private employment in local services. To be effective, such strategies cannot 
primarily aim at attractive jobs in the middle and upper ranges of the labor 
market (even though changes in the financing of high-quality services, to be 
discussed below, could make a difference there as well). At any rate, any 
attempt to close the European employment gap must address the specific 
problems of low-skill groups — and if the solution is to be found in the private 
sector, that implies that European countries must actively promote the creation 
of a low-wage labor market that does not presently exist. In order to be 
normatively acceptable and politically feasible, however, European solutions 
cannot allow the emergence of a large underclass of the ‘working poor’. Hence
14 In Germany, there are practically no negotiated wage scales with hourly rates below DM 




























































































low-wage jobs, European style, would still need to provide net incomes well 
above the subsistence level defined by social-assistance rules.
If the problem is defined in this fashion, the solution seems to require a 
reorientation of the welfare state from providing full income support for persons 
who are full-time unemployed to providing partial income support for persons 
working at wages below the present minimum level. The most comprehensive 
solution could be achieved by a fundamental reorganization of the welfare state 
along the lines of a negative-income tax — which is presently discussed in 
Germany under the name of ‘Biirgergeld’ (Mitschke 1985; 1995).
1000 1500 2400




























































































The negative income tax would replace all present forms of means-tested social 
transfer payments by a single payment that decreases at a rate of, say, 50 per 
cent as income from work (or other sources) increases. The diagram represents 
the situation of a single person who only receives income from work.15 It is also 
assumed that in the absence of any other income, the negative tax would 
guarantee a subsistence income of DM 1100 per month. At a degression rate of 
50 per cent, transfers would cease when income from work exceeds DM 2200 
per month. It is further assumed that the net reservation wage of workers at the 
low end of the labor market still remains at DM 1600. But at that level, the net 
wage received from the employer would now be only DM 1000, while DM 600 
would be received from the negative tax. Even if the employer would still have 
to pay a social-insurance surcharge of 50 per cent, the total wage bill would 
then be reduced by more than one third, from DM 2400 to 1500. The negative 
income tax would thus open up a wide range of additional, economically viable 
employment opportunities at the lower end of the labor market.
That, however, is no reason for optimism. By its own logic, the negative income 
tax would require a far-reaching restructuring of the present systems of taxation, 
social assistance, social insurance, pensions, and wage setting. Moreover, the 
available estimates of its overall financial consequences are still enormously 
diverging.16 Thus, chances are slim that Continental welfare states could soon 
be reorganized in this fundamental fashion.
Many of these difficulties could be avoided, however, by more modest, less 
costly, and simpler proposals that would focus exclusively on job creation, 
rather than attempting a fundamental reorganization of the welfare state. Such 
solutions would simply provide income subsidies to workers in low-wage jobs 
below the present effective minimum, and leave all other present rules as they 
are (Scharpf 1993). In both versions, however, the employment effect of income 
subsidies would depend on the cooperation of unions that would have to agree 
to the creation of new wage scales below the present minimum level. That is not
15 The negative income tax, like the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States and 
similar schemes in the UK and in Ireland, would be oriented toward family or household 
incomes —  which is not the optimal criterion from a purely employment-oriented perspective. 
This aspect is not reflected in the diagram.
16 A major cost factor results from the fact that the lower threshold of income taxation will 
shift from the present subsistence level to twice that amount. Beyond that, the estimates are 
highly sensitive to assumptions about how the higher threshold should be treated throughout 
the tax scale, and about which present transfers are to be replaced by the negative income tax. 
As a consequence, estimates of net costs (in the absence of any employment effects) vary 




























































































an attractive function for unions that see their mission in raising, rather than 
lowering, minimum wages. Moreover, unions fear that wage reductions at the 
lower end could induce a general erosion of the present wage structure 
(Hanesch 1995). Even though that objection may not be plausible in economic 
theory, it has so far prevented political parties in Germany from responding to 
proposals of this nature.
Nevertheless, there is now a slight hope that a functionally equivalent solution 
— which would not depend on the active cooperation of the unions — might 
find more political support. Its feasibility rests on precisely those features of the 
Continental welfare states that are so damaging to service employment, i.e., 
their dependence on social insurance contributions from employers and workers 
as a major source of welfare finance. In Germany, for example, they presently 
amount to about 42 per cent of the employer’s wage bill, and they are shared 
equally between employers’ and worker’s contributions. Hence, if these 
contributions were (almost) completely waived at and below the present 
minimum wage of about 10 DM per hour, the wage bill of the employer would 
be reduced by 22 per cent — which would increase the profitability of service 
employment by the same percentage.17 At the same time, the take-home pay of 
the worker would also increase by the same percentage — which would 
increase the attractiveness of low-end jobs and, perhaps, would also make jobs 
below the present minimum wage more attractive.
Of course, these jobs would still need to be fully covered by the social insurance 
system. Hence, the contributions waived would have to be made up by 
payments financed from general tax revenues. Like the negative income tax, the 
size of the subsidy would have to decrease at higher wage levels. Thus, one 
might eliminate contributions almost totally at and below the level of the 
present minimum wage, and the subsidy could again be reduced to zero at twice 
that level. But these are matters for political judgment and compromise, which 
would have to vary from one country to another. In principle, however, this 
solution should be open to all countries that are financing very large shares of 
their social expenditure through non-wage labor costs.
In conclusion, I suggest, the Continental employment gap does not primarily 
result from a loss of international competitiveness. It affects the sheltered sector 
only; it is caused not by the size of the welfare state, but by its characteristic 
structure and mode of financing; and these causes could be remedied by
17 A more far-reaching proposal following the same logic has been presented by Jean-Paul 
Fitoussi (1994): It would relieve employers of the social-insurance contributions required at 




























































































institutional reforms that would increase, rather than destroy, the level of social- 
policy support for disadvantaged groups in Continental societies. In other 
words, the rigidities that seem to matter here are the rigidities of political 
systems that are incapable of effective reforms, rather than the alleged rigidities 
of the labor market.
3. The Erosion o f the Tax Base
To the extent that unemployment could be transformed into subsidized 
employment in the private sector, the fiscal pressures on the welfare state would 
be reduced.18 In that case, the present Continental practice of relying largely on 
social insurance contributions for its finance might in fact have certain 
advantages over some alternative types of tax finance.19 It is a form of raising 
revenue which, because of its perceived insurance character, may be less likely 
to provoke tax resistance than, say income taxes. Moreover, since the ultimate 
incidence even of employers’ contributions is likely to be on the take-home pay 
of the worker, it should also be less vulnerable to the pressures of regulatory 
and tax competition for mobile factors of production.20 Thus, if changes are 
considered at all, they probably should emphasize the insurance character even 
more by eliminating employers’ contributions altogether and moving from 
systems that insure only workers to systems of universal and compulsory 
individual insurance (which would also have the effect of reducing the 
contributions paid by individual workers, who are presently required to pay for 
the insurance of the non-working population as well).
If a negative income tax system were in place that assures basic incomes for 
everybody, including pensioners, the insurance contributions would only have
18 Quantitative estimates of the employment effect of the negative income tax and similar 
schemes are not available, and for good reasons: In order to be effective, these programs must 
change the present structures of labor markets — hence simulation models validated by time 
series data reflecting past and existing structures cannot be used to predict their effects. At the 
most, it might be possible to estimate how many, and which, presently existing jobs would be 
lost in the United States if the U.S. labor market were truncated at the de-facto minimum 
wage that is presently effective in Germany.
19 In this regard, I must now qualify a more negative judgment of non-wage labor costs in 
an earlier article (Scharpf 1997, 31).
20 That conclusion may seem overly optimistic in light of the persistent political campaign 
of employers and business associations against the high level of non-wage labor costs in 
Germany and other Continental countries. Conceivably, business decisions may be as much 





























































































to cover income risks above that level, and would only have to be paid by 
persons with incomes (from any source) above the minimum level. In the 
absence of a negative income tax, contributions from persons with low incomes 
would need to be substituted or subsidized from general tax revenues. These 
changes would in effect immunize those parts of the welfare state that assure 
income support in cases of unemployment, sickness, disability and old age, 
against the competitive pressures of an internationalized economy. Insurance 
contributions, even if required by law, would assume the character of private 
investment or consumption expenditures, rather than of public burdens on the 
economy.
However, if the insurance elements of social security are emphasized more, that 
would leave a larger part of redistributive transfers to be financed from general 
tax revenues. That would add to the difficulties European countries already face 
in raising the taxes to finance existing levels of public services. As discussed 
before, these problems result from the economic competition over mobile tax 
bases, which primarily affects the taxation of capital incomes, business taxes, 
and taxes on the personal incomes of internationally mobile professionals. As it 
is, countries are responding by reducing the rates of taxation, sometimes to zero, 
and by increasing the tax burden on less mobile factors. This, in turn, increases 
the political tax resistance of those groups that cannot escape national taxes by 
moving their assets, or themselves, out of the country. So what options do 
remain?
The most general escape route considered seems to involve a shift from taxes on 
profits and incomes to taxes on consumption — including taxes on energy 
input, on pollution and other ‘green’ taxes. They have the dual advantages of 
being difficult to avoid even for the owners of highly mobile assets and, if 
applied in the form of a value-added tax, of affecting imports as much as local 
production, and of not burdening exports.21 But consumption taxes are also 
associated with two disadvantages. First, at uniform rates their distributive 
impact tends to be regressive since poor people must spend larger shares of 
income than rich people. Hence countries that already depend heavily on 
consumption taxes tend to have split tax rates — high for ‘luxury goods’ and 
low for ‘basic needs’.22 Second, and perhaps more important, generally high 
consumption taxes would eliminate low-productive service employment just as
21 Within the European Community, that is of course only true as long as the ‘country-of- 
destination principle’ is still in force.
22 Discussion on the more radical option of replacing the progressive income tax by a 
progressive tax on consumption expenditures is not sufficiently advanced in Europe to allow 




























































































effectively from the ‘official’ labor market as was shown to be true for high 
payroll taxes. Hence it would also be necessary to reduce or eliminate the value- 
added tax on services produced by low-wage labor. Unfortunately, both of these 
forms of ‘positive discrimination’ are difficult to define and also difficult to 
implement efficiently.
The second option, that so far is not actively explored in Europe, concerns 
services that are presently provided free of charge, or with heavy subsidies by 
the public sector.23 Many of these — e.g., secondary and higher education or 
museums and opera houses — are predominantly used by the medium and 
higher income groups whose tax burden must be reduced as a consequence of 
international tax competition and political tax resistance. At the same time, 
however, high quality universities, cultural facilities or medical services have 
become even more important for maintaining, or increasing, the economic 
attractiveness of regions exposed to international competition. Hence, cutting 
back on these services under the pressures of international competition, as is 
presently happening in most European welfare states, is likely to be self- 
defeating in economic terms. The same is true of much of the public 
infrastructure in transportation or communication, and of essential public 
services from waste removal to public security.
In some of these areas, like telecommunications and air transport, privatization 
may be the perfect answer; in others like waste removal and the maintenance of 
residential roads, cost-covering user charges have long been used and are 
considered unproblematic. Still other services, as for instance public security 
and crime prevention, may have the character of ‘club goods’ at the level of 
local communities which, if transparently financed by local taxes, will 
encounter little taxpayer resistance. Others, like national defense, are in the 
nature of ‘pure public goods’ that must be financed from general tax revenues if 
they are to be provided at all.
But that still leaves a wide range of facilities and services that provide ‘private 
goods’ of great value to those who use them, but which also are important to the 
social, cultural and economic viability of advanced industrial societies (i.e., they 
have positive externalities). However, they are not used by everybody, or not by 
everybody all the time, and they tend to be used more frequently and more 
intensively by high-income groups. At the same time, the full cost of their 
provision is so high that low-income groups would be unable to afford these 
services even if a negative income tax or similar redistributive schemes were in
23 Perhaps the decision of the new Labour government in Britain to charge substantial 




























































































place. In European welfare states, the traditional response to this distributive 
constellation has been to provide high quality services to everybody free of 
charge, or at heavily subsidized user charges, and to rely on progressive 
taxation in order to make high-income groups pay a disproportionate share of 
their cost.
As this form of financing is eroding under the pressure of international tax 
competition, and is losing its normative plausibility as national tax systems are 
becoming more regressive, one of two scenarios seem possible. In the first, the 
quality of universal public services is progressively reduced to the point where 
they become a ‘poor man’s’ option while the rich will emigrate to expensive 
private schools, private universities and private medical practice. Alternatively, 
public services will be reduced, and publicly financed or subsidized facilities 
will be closed down, to such an extent that the ideal of universal access to 
quality libraries, museums, theater, opera and concert performances, swimming 
pools and sports facilities, or public transport, will be abandoned altogether. 
What will survive, then, are private facilities serving luxury markets or catering 
either to the highly concentrated demand in a few metropolises (as is true on 
Broadway) or to the common tastes of mass audiences.24
Much of this is happening already, and not all of it is unacceptable. But where it 
is considered unacceptable, a second scenario needs to be explored that aims at 
maintaining the ideal of universally available high quality services by shifting a 
larger part of their financial support from general tax revenues to means-tested 
user charges. The logic is simple: If high-income groups are no longer willing 
to pay the high taxes that could support free services, they could at least be 
made to pay the full cost of those services that they are in fact using. Social 
justice could then be maintained by providing means-tested vouchers for low 
and medium income families that could not afford to pay full-cost user 
charges25 — which would have the attractive side effect of introducing a strong 
element of consumer power into the governance of education and other public 
service sectors, and of allowing competition on equal terms between public and 
private service providers.
24 It is true that the electronic media are now able to provide highly specialized information 
and entertainment services to dispersed audiences that could not previously have supported 
commercial programs catering to their tastes or needs. But that covers only a relatively small 
range of the classical functions of public services and infrastructure facilities.
25 If it is thought to be a problem that university students should be made dependent on 
their families, vouchers could be made available to all (qualified) students, but recipients 
might be required to pay a lifelong surcharge on their income tax which, on average, would 




























































































To summarize: There is reason to expect that increasing constraints on the 
national capacity to tax will affect the viability of European welfare states. 
Nevertheless, the values served by the welfare state may be defended by a shift 
from highly vulnerable sources of revenue to modes of finance that are more 
robust against the pressures of economic competition. Depending on the 
existing mix of transfers and services, and existing patterns of finance, optimal 
solutions would surely differ from one country to another. Nevertheless, it 
should be worthwhile in most countries to emphasize differentiated 
consumption taxes for the collection of general revenue, to emphasize 
individual insurance for the financing of income-maintaining transfers, and to 
emphasize means-tested user charges for the financing of public services. These 
suggestions are not meant as patent solutions, and they certainly would not be 
easy to adopt and implement, but they are meant to show that the democratic 
welfare state is not condemned to abdicate, or to organize its own dismantling, 
even if the hope for its reconstruction through positive integration at the 
European level should not be fulfilled.
This conclusion contrasts, somewhat, with the deep pessimism of authors who 
have long studied and thought deeply about changing conditions in the area of 
industrial relations (Visser/Ebbinghaus 1992; Streeck 1997). What I could add 
is the observation, based on the employment data presented above, that 
apparently the most highly institutionalized (‘corporatisf) industrial relations 
systems have not been doing badly at all in terms of maintaining high levels of 
employment in the internationally exposed sectors of the economy (Neubaumer 
1997). If this were more generally realized, perhaps political campaigns against 
the institutional ‘rigidities’ of corporatist industrial relations would appear less 
justified by the pressures of international economic competition.
That is not meant to suggest that the corporatist model of highly 
institutionalized ‘cooperative’ industrial relations should be generally superior, 
under present conditions, to the Anglo-American model of deregulated labor 
markets, shareholder-oriented corporate governance and highly decentralized 
wage negotiations (Streeck 1995; 1997). It seems more likely that both of these 
models are able to succeed reasonably well in a highly competitive international 
environment (OECD 1997). But what of countries in which industrial-relations 
institutions have not been weakened to the extent that is true in the United 
States and in Britain, but are also not ‘cooperative’ to the extent that is possible 
in Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Germany or the Netherlands? For them, one 
might expect serious difficulties — especially if they should become members 
of the European Monetary Union. Given a uniform rate of inflation throughout 
the EMU, countries where the rise of unit labor costs exceeds the current rate of 




























































































unemployment in the exposed sectors. Countries with corporatist institutions 
are, in principle, capable of influencing wage setting to avoid such 
consequences (Scharpf 1991); and presumably market-driven systems can do so 
as well. The critical question for other countries then seems to be whether they 
will be able to change their existing industrial-relations institutions in one or the 
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